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A large body of research suggests mass publics are capable of thinking coherently about 
international relations. We extend this body of research to show that domain relevant 
postures—in our case, more abstract beliefs about foreign policy—are related to how tough of 
a line representative samples of US and UK respondents want their governments to take 
towards China. More specifically, we utilize a unique comparative survey of American and 
British foreign policy attitudes to show broad support for toughness towards China. Beliefs 
about the use of the military and attitudes regarding globalisation help explain preferences for 
tough economic and military policies towards China. In the two countries, the relationship 
between general foreign policy outlooks and the positions citizens take is robust to the 
addition of a general mediator that controls for the general affect those surveyed have towards 
China. Finally, the strength of the relationship between these abstract postures and specific 
preferences for a China policy are different across the countries.	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Over the past three decades, political scientists gathered a steady stream of evidence to show 
that citizens in multiple countries have well-structured foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Bjereld 
and Ekengren (1999) [Sweden]; Chittick et al. (1995) [US]; Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) [US]; 
Hurwitz et al. (1993) [Costa Rica]; Jenkins-Smith et al. (2004) [UK]; Munton and Keating 
(2001) [Canada]; Noel et al. (2004) [Canada]; Reifler et al. (2011) [UK]; Richman et al. 
(1997) [US]). Moreover, research shows that citizen attitudes respond to changing 
international and domestic circumstances in understandable and reasonable ways (Gelpi 2010; 
Kertzer 2013; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Shapiro and Page 1988; Wlezien 1995; though see 
Baum and Groeling 2010 for a more nuanced and pessimistic argument). In this paper, we 
build on this existing research to show that these structured abstract foreign policy beliefs (or 
“postures”) help explain American and British policy preferences towards China. Specifically, 
we utilize hierarchical constraint models (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) to show that specific 
attitudes about China policy flow from foreign policy postures. We find that both security and 
economic postures are relevant in explaining support for toughness towards China. 	  
 There are important differences in the salience of China as an issue when the US and 
UK are compared to one another.1 In the United States, issues involving engagement with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By way of illustration, we utilized the Factiva database and conducted searches for articles with the 
terms “China” and either “Military” or  “Economy” that appeared in The New York Times (NYT), The 
Telegraph, The Guardian, and The Daily Mail over the course of the two weeks prior to the surveys 
entering the field (January 16-January 31, 2013). On the military aspect, coverage in the NYT is much 
different from what appears in the three large circulation (but ideologically distinct) British papers. In the 
former, multiple articles focus on the potential for military confrontations between the US and China as a 
result of China’s territorial dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea. Other coverage focuses 
on President Obama’s interest in building up US military strength in Asia to counter the growth of the 
Chinese military and the potential for China to engage in cyber-attacks on US government and businesses. 
In the British papers, there was coverage of the Chinese-Japanese territorial dispute and the potential for 
a US-China military confrontation, but little mention of British military interests or involvement.  
On the economic front, the NYT ran two stories mentioning environmental degradation accompanying 
China’s economic rise, with one piece mentioning Republican claims that the US could not compete with 
China economically with stricter environmental regulations. In contrast, limited discussion in The 
Telegraph centred on how Britain’s tough visa regime hurt the UK economy because it limited tourism, 
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China—from economic and trade competition to the possibilities of military tension—
frequently appear in the news. In the United Kingdom, less news coverage is devoted to 
China overall and in particular there is less news reporting dedicated to the prospect of 
economic or military conflict between China and Great Britain. This paper exploits this 
difference by comparing the influence of foreign policy postures on China attitudes across 
these contexts. We find foreign policy beliefs of Americans to be more closely linked to the 
level of toughness they demand of their Government’s China policies. However, this is not to 
say that foreign policy postures are irrelevant for British attitudes towards China; postures are 
significant predictors of China preferences in the United Kingdom as well. We also find that 
the relevance of the postures is robust to adding a “likability heuristic” or feeling thermometer 
towards China to the model—that is these broad beliefs have a direct effect on preferences for 
getting tough in two policy domains even after controlling for how these beliefs influence 
affect towards China. 	  
	  
On and Off the Radar: China opinion in the US and UK	  
America and China  	  
There is a long history of polling Americans on the issue of China—measuring 
American attitudes towards the threat posed by the People’s Republic is commonplace in the 
wake of Mao’s triumph in 1949 and the Chinese involvement in the Korean War. Moreover, 
trends in American attitudes towards China feature important shifts over time. Americans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
students, and investment from China, and a brief report suggested Mandarin be taught to British 
schoolchildren so that UK businesses could take full advantage of China’s expansion (25 January 2013). 
At least in the short time period covered, the tone of the articles in British papers suggest that a more 
open relationship with China might help the UK reap the benefits of China’s economic rise. A more 
extensive time series analysis would be necessary to convincingly determine whether media coverage 
drives attitudes towards China. However, it does appear that the media messages British and American 
respondents receive are different, particularly when it comes to the military threat posed by China.  
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view China as a primary threat in the 1950s and 1960s, but views soften somewhat in the 
1970s (Kuznitz 1984). However, there is important variation underneath these more gradual 
shifts. One example comes from the Truman Administration; Republicans were much more 
critical of Sino-American policies, likely attributable to the view that the Democratic 
President was responsible for “losing China” [and Korea] to the Communists (Wittkopf 
1990). 	  
At other points in time, public opinion appears to have played an important role in the 
policymaking calculus of American leaders. Foyle (1997) details how President Eisenhower 
and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles turn against unilateral action in the defence of 
Taiwan from mainland Communist China in the early 1950s because of a perception of a 
divide in domestic public opinion. Similarly, Rusk (1990) notes Kennedy’s caution in his 
engagement with the China issue and attributes this reticence to a fear of negative public 
reaction towards proposed White House policies. 	  
While Eisenhower and Kennedy appear to allow concerns over public opinion to 
constrain action vis-à-vis China, Steele (1966) sees a public open to a more flexible and 
engaged policy during thaws in the Cold War. By the 1970s, the initiatives of Nixon and 
Carter help to improve both relations between the two countries and Americans’ views of 
China, but attitudes sour considerably after the violent suppression of student protestors in 
Tiananmen Square. Ultimately, Holsti (2004) describes the American public’s reactions to 
China and the policies they want their state to pursue as “events driven” and “rational”. 
Citizens cool when China engages in policies that threaten the United States, but warm when 
elites make overtures towards working with one another.	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Page and Bouton (2006) observe that by the early 2000s Americans overwhelmingly 
favour maintaining diplomatic relations with China and believe that the United States has a 
vital interest in engagement with China. In particular, the authors note a shift in American 
priorities towards matters of trade and economic commitments. Page and Xie (2010) show 
that Americans see the benefits China can provide in terms of the availability of cheap 
imports, but they also believe that the Chinese do not play fair when trading with the United 
States. On the military front, a slim majority of Americans want to work hard to contain 
Chinese military power, but only a minority are willing to see the United States mobilise 
ground forces against China’s large military if the latter invades Taiwan (Page and Bouton 
2006; Page and Xie 2010). 	  
	  
Britain and China	  
Measurements of British attitudes towards China are sparse and infrequent. Early 
work by Younger (1955) speculates that public opinion is not as relevant in the United 
Kingdom as it is in the United States in shaping elite actions when dealing with Communist 
China. With some limited exceptions (e.g. Hong Kong), the British public’s attitudes towards 
China rarely appear as a topic of conversation in media or academic journals (Hoge 1997). In 
contrast, British elites do see the rise of China as a “driver of change” that will affect the 
United Kingdom in the coming decades. There are some conjectures that European public 
opinions towards China can harden if trade moves away from the import of low cost Chinese 
basic goods into the European Union and to flooding British and EU markets with high 
quality goods that rival those produced by domestic industries (Jacques 2009). 	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British policymakers and their European counterparts also treat the rise of China as a 
military power with less suspicion than their American allies. Like the United States, the EU 
maintains an arms embargo on China, but opinions as to the appropriateness of maintaining 
bans on weapons sales is a topic more open to debate among European policymakers (Dai 
2009). The rise of China simply is less salient in Europe than it is in the United States, and 
elites are less likely at this point in time to view China as an imminent threat. However, this 
may change if more attention is paid to the country  by elites, if trade wars heat up, or human 
rights practices by China catch the attention of activists in the United Kingdom and across 
Europe.	  
Compared to the British, Americans hear more about China’s status as a growing 
superpower in the media and the potential challenges this poses to US dominance (Peng 2004; 
Stone and Xiao 2007). Studies also find that the BBC’s coverage of China is robust but does 
not focus on the impact of China’s rise on the United Kingdom (Sieb and Powers 2010). This 
difference and the lack of worry by policymakers suggest that British attitudes concerning 
their country’s China policy will not be as well formulated and that predictors of the public’s 
attitudes in the United Kingdom likely will be weak and more difficult to establish.	  
	  
	  
Sources of Specific Attitudes towards China	  
Our primary interest in this paper is to understand better American and British 
attitudes towards China. By attitudes we do not just mean how those residing in these two 
western states view China generally, but rather the toughness of the policies they want their 
country to pursue in two policy realms most relevant to bilateral and multilateral relations—
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trade and military engagement. We demonstrate below that UK and US citizens possess 
abstract foreign policy attitudes that retain the same structure in both states. A direct linkage 
between abstract policy views and demands for toughness towards China in two different 
policy spheres is suggestive of higher order thinking both about foreign policy, in general, 
and the stance people believe their country should take towards China, specifically. 
Suggestive evidence of an even higher level of thinking on the part of citizens occurs if the 
postures have different relationships to each of the citizen demands for tough military and 
trade policies. As there are multiple substantive factors, partisan differences, and standard 
control variables that can be related to attitudes towards China, we first elaborate and justify 
the independent variables to appear in the multivariate models below. 	  
	  
Our key variables of theoretical interest – foreign policy postures 	  
A cottage industry of research shows that American attitudes about foreign policy 
have a coherent multi-dimensional structure. The exact number and content of dimensions is a 
function of the available data and the modelling strategy. Nonetheless, a dominant theme in 
the work is that peoples’ beliefs about the strength and proper use of their country’s military 
(militarism) is separate from attitudes towards the appropriateness of employing instruments 
of soft power such as the dispersal of foreign aid (liberal internationalism) (e.g. Wittkopf 
1986, 1990).2  Although less well studied, these dimensions appear to hold approximately 
among the UK public as well (e.g. Reifler et al. 2011). 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This militarism vs. liberal internationalism separation is not the only approach to understanding key points of 
conflict in the dimensionality debate. Some scholars make the case for a separate “isolationist-internationalist” 
dimension arguing that militarism and liberal internationalism dimensions describe how the people think their 
country should engage with the world but an isolationism dimension is necessary to tap whether respondents 
want their state to engage with the world at all (Rathbun 2007: 387; Kegley and Wittkopf 1982). This debate is 
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The most relevant forerunner for our present analysis is the seminal article by Hurwitz 
and Peffley (1987) on belief systems and foreign affairs. Dimensions extracted via factor 
analysis reveal postures or a middle ground between an individual’s core beliefs and their 
positions on specific policy issues. We emulate many features of Hurwitz and Peffley’s 
analysis—we include variables that tap the three postures of isolationism, militarism, 
patriotism (or ethnocentrism as Hurwitz and Peffley call it), and include in the models 
controls for economic evaluations and partisan identification. Within this hierarchical 
framework, we make a number of specific predictions about sources of support for toughness 
towards China. 	  
We first turn to isolationism. Isolationists want to avoid unnecessary entanglements 
beyond state borders. This should lead those high in this sentiment to shy away from wishing 
their government to pursue policies other states may view as provocative. Consequently, we 
expect: 	  
 
H1: Higher levels of isolationism present among respondents from the 
United States and Great Britain co-varies with a reduced propensity to 
support the government pursuing tough military and economic policies 
towards China.	  
	  
An isolationism dimension taps respondents’ attitudes for how they want their state to 
interact with other countries across a variety of issues. In contrast, a militarism dimension 
captures citizens’ beliefs that their country’s military should be strong and ready for action if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
largely orthogonal to our specific focus, which is to show that foreign policy postures serve as prominent 
covariates of citizen demands for tough China policies from their governments. . 
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the country’s interest requires its use—either to keep it secure from attack or project its values 
and power (Page and Bouton 2006). A citizenry that thinks more deeply about engagement 
with China is prone to utilize different dimensions when responding to different aspects of 
their state’s China policy. If this higher level of awareness holds, empirical estimations should 
establish that:   	  
	  
H2: Respondents’ positions on the militarism dimension are more closely 
tied to their preferences for a tough state military policy towards China than 
they are for a tough economic policy towards China.	  
	  
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) treat preferences for free trade as a specific issue, but we 
contend that attitudes towards globalisation are properly thought of as a midlevel posture. As 
is the case with the militarism posture, we consider evidence of higher ordered citizen 
thinking about their state’s China policy to occur if:	  
 	  
H3: Respondent support for globalisation has a significant and negative  association 
with their preferences for a tough state economic policy towards China. The 
magnitude of this linkage is larger than the relationship between globalisation and 
preferences for a tough military policy. 	  
   	  
The three latent variables, whose structure and measurement we describe below, differ in that 
isolationism is expected to co-vary significantly with preferences for both a strong economic 
and military policy. If citizens think deeply about how their country should react to the 
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multifaceted rise of China, preferences for globalisation should be more closely linked to 
attitudes about the level of toughness of their country’s economic policy while preferences for 
militarism should have a stronger association with demands for a tough military policy 
towards China.	  
	  
Additional variables of interest 	  
Partisanship:  We have divergent cross-country expectations about the role 
partisanship should play as a “perceptual screen” (cf. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008) when it comes 
to shaping citizen preferences towards their country’s international relations with China. In 
contemporary America, it seems that on nearly all issues there are noticeable differences in 
the policy opinions of Republicans and Democrats (Jacobson 2010). Consequently, we expect 
this also to apply to the issue of China and we will observe differences between Republicans 
and Democrats on preferences for toughness, even after controlling for other variables. 	  
This expectation requires further explanation as there is a burgeoning debate in the 
literature concerning the role of partisanship in influencing American attitudes towards China. 
Some argue that partisanship (and ideology) primarily have an indirect effect on foreign 
policy preferences by affecting perceptions of threat and more abstract foreign goals (e.g. 
Page and Bouton 2006 for a general argument, and Page and Xie 2010 for a more China 
specific argument). Peter Gries (2011, 2014a, 2014b) critiques this approach arguing that 
partisanship and ideology play an important role in shaping Americans’ attitudes far more 
directly. In the case of China, the more direct effects of partisanship are rooted in a greater 
antipathy towards communism. Our expectation is that for the US, partisanship will reach 
statistical significance. Of course, a significant partisanship variable in the models we present 
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does not necessarily validate or repudiate one or the other of these competing theoretical 
accounts. However, given the ubiquity of partisanship in explanations of American political 
opinions and behavior, we tend to favor an interpretation where partisanship has at least some 
direct influence on the content of both general foreign policy preferences and China attitudes 
more specifically. 	  
In the United Kingdom, research suggests that there are partisan differences in foreign 
policy beliefs—those more supportive of the use of force have a higher affect towards the 
Conservative Party and its leader, while those who fit the mold of “cooperative 
internationalists” feel warmly towards the Liberal Democrats (Reifler et al. 2011). In practice, 
however, British parties have a habit of not differentiating themselves in a clear and 
meaningful way on foreign policy. Even on the salient matters of military interventions in 
Libya and Afghanistan, the similarity in party positions limits the ability to observe elite 
influence (Reifler et al. 2014). Consequently, we expect that partisan attachments will have 
little impact on British preferences for toughness towards China. In summary:	  
	  
H4: The long term attachments of Americans to a political party, as 
represented by their responses to a standard partisan identification question, 
will significantly influence the degree of toughness they seek from their 
country’s  China policies—Democratic respondents will favour a softer 
approach while Republicans will demand toughness. In Great Britain, 
respondents’ partisan affiliations will have little direct effect on attitudes 
towards the approach the UK government should take towards China. 	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Economic perceptions: A fundamental variable motivating political behaviour and 
voting is citizens’ perceptions of the state of the economy (e.g. van der Brug et al. 2007; Duch 
and Stevenson 2008). Page and Bouton (2006) note that Americans pay attention to their own 
economic interests when thinking about trade and globalisation, and this leads to our 
hypothesis that: 	  
	  
H5: Economic evaluations affect support for toughness on China. Those who 
have more negative evaluations of the economy or household finances will 
support greater toughness towards China.	  
	  
 Ethnocentrism/Patriotism:  Classic work in social psychology holds that foreign 
countries are socially acceptable targets for the projection and displacement of anxieties 
(Silverstein 1989). Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) label the belief in national superiority 
“ethnocentrism” and place it as a core value that predicts positions on postures and only 
indirectly influences specific foreign policy issues. Given a wider range of indicators 
available to us, we examine the link between blind patriotism (cf. Schatz et al. 1999; Huddy 
and Khatib 2007) and preferences for tougher China policies. Like ethnocentrism, the 
measure of patriotism we describe below taps agreement with a belief in the superiority of 
one’s country. However, our measure also incorporates beliefs about the appropriateness of 
blindly following the government’s policies. We expect that:	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H6: There is a direct and positive relationship between respondents’ 
agreement that citizens should blindly support US/UK policies and those 
who want tougher policies towards China. 	  
	  
The Likeability Heuristic: Recent work by Peter Gries (2014:43) asserts that “gut 
feelings towards foreign countries serve as a vital mediator between ideological 
predispositions on the one hand, and specific foreign policy preferences on the other.”  Our 
interpretation of this position is that the immediate antecedent to preferences for toughness 
vis-a-vis China is how warmly one feels towards China, and that other variables influence 
one’s warmth towards China. If this approach is correct, then once a feeling thermometer is 
added to the model as a mediator, much of the direct relationships we observe between 
postures, partisanship, patriotism, and economic evaluations should weaken significantly. We 
depart slightly from Gries (2014) and examine whether mediation via a China feeling 
thermometer occurs for five key variables in our primary analysis. 	  
	  
H7: Respondents’ support for a tough China policy in both the economic and 
military policy realms operates via general affect towards China.	  
	  
The greater salience of China in the United States compared to Great Britain leads us 
to cross-country expectations concerning the rival hypotheses presented above:	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H8:  The covariates described in this section will have better explanatory power in 
 explaining citizen preferences for tough China policies in the United States than in 
 Great Britain.	  
	  
H9: Americans will utilize different postures to inform their foreign policy  preferences 
towards China in the economic and military domains while the influence of the 
postures will be more even across the two policies among the less informed British 
respondents. 	  
	  
	  
Data, Variables, and Methods	  
Data and Dependent Variables:  In February 2013, 1,891 British and 1,858 American 
respondents completed the third wave of a YouGov online panel survey explicitly fielded for 
the purposes of better understanding the foreign policy attitudes of both publics.3   Two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 YouGov’s methodology for ensuring the samples are reasonably representative of target populations 
differs slightly across the two countries: In the US, respondents to the YouGov survey are drawn by 
matched quota sampling from a non-probability sample of over 1 million volunteer panelists who take the 
surveys in exchange for prizes or cash. The methodology for YouGov’s procedures is described in Rivers 
(2007) and Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) report the high comparability of estimations utilizing this 
method to those obtained utilizing standard nationally representative RDD telephone interviewing. In the 
UK, YouGov builds a sample by drawing from its respondent panel of over 350,000 Britons who have 
signed up to take surveys in exchange for entries into prize draws or points on an account that eventually 
can be redeemed for a cash prize. The methodology for YouGov’s UK procedures is reported by Sanders 
et al. (2007) to yield multivariate results that are highly comparable to estimates obtained utilizing 
responses from probability sampling with face-to-face interviewing. To obtain a sample that 
approximately is representative of Great Britain (Northern Ireland is excluded from the sampling frame), 
specific surveys are opened to a subset of the panel that is representative of the known population in terms 
of age, gender, class, and newspaper readership in Britain. In the multivariate analyses, post-sampling 
weights are employed to bring the sample further into line with the population’s known characteristics as 
derived from either the national census or a large scale probability sample (e.g. the Current Population 
Survey in the US or the National Readership Survey in the UK). Details on the observed and weighted 
characteristics of the US and UK samples are presented in the Online Appendix, but the big difference 
between the observed and weighted demographic characteristics of the panel lie with the underestimation 
of youth who participated in both samples. Attrition from this demographic mimics what is observed in 
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outcome variables come from this wave of the survey. These are a) a question asking 
respondents “Thinking about US/UK policy towards China, do you think it is important to be 
tough with China on economic and trade issues?”; and b) a question asking respondents 
“Thinking about US/UK policy towards China, do you think it is important to be tough with 
China on military issues?”  Available responses to these two questions falls along a four point 
ordinal scale ranging from “No, not at all important” to “Yes, very important”, and the 
question is similar to one employed by the Pew Research Centre in a recent China focused 
survey.4  In the last set of multivariate analyses below, we employ a 101 point “feeling 
thermometer” as a mediator. This probe provides respondents with a scale ranging from 0 to 
100, with 0 labelled “very coldly” and 100 labelled “very warmly”, and asks them to evaluate 
“China” in general—not the Government, Chinese people, or in any other context. 	  
Independent variables: Hypothesized covariates for the multivariate models derive 
from the interviewees’ responses to questions asked on November 2011 and May/June 2012 
waves of the survey. To improve the reliability and validity of key independent variables of 
interest, we hypothesize multiple survey indicators to be reflective of latent factors of each 
concept. Below, we employ Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to ensure that the factor 
structure is valid; these analyses employ a robust weighted least squares estimator to enable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
probability based panel studies as is the underrepresentation of minorities and those of lower socio-
economic status (see Watson and Wooden 2009 and Lipps 2009). 
 
4 Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, (2012). U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies: Public Deeply 
Concerned About China's Economic Power. [online] Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/09/US-
Public-and-Elite-Report-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-September-18-2012.pdf [Accessed 23 Nov. 2014]. The middle 
categories are “No, Not too important” and “Yes, Somewhat important.” Don’t know responses to the two 
toughness questions and the thermometer scale are classified as missing cases and modelled as a function of the 
observed covariates. The order the two toughness questions appear on the surveys randomly are alternated. 
Fieldwork was funded by a grant to [REDACTED] from the Economic and Social Research Council of the 
United Kingdom (ESRC). 
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us to derive the latent variables by appropriately treating responses to the agree-disagree 
survey questions as ordinal. A brief description of the indicators follows, but for the sake of 
brevity, we relegate full question wording of the items, the wave each item appears on the 
survey and response distributions to the online Appendix.	  
Latent Variables:   	  
 1) Militarism Posture:  A latent variable where higher scores motivate positive  
 responses to questions asking whether respondents think military spending  
 should be increased and agreement with a question as whether the respondent  
 believes that their country should be willing to use force in the face of
 expansionist aggression by another state.	  
 2) Isolationism Posture: A latent variable where those scoring highly on the  
 dimension are prone to agree with survey questions asking whether their   
 country should avoid involvement with other countries, whether 	  
getting involved in other states  risks the wellbeing of domestic citizens, and whether 
their country should simply mind its own business in its conduct of foreign policy.	  
 3) Globalisation Posture: A latent variable where those scoring highly have a  
 propensity to believe increases in trade between countries has a positive   
 outcome on the respondent and their families, domestic factory workers, the  
 domestic economy writ large, domestic consumers, and domestic businesses. 	  
 4) Patriotism:  Respondents high on the negative form of patriotism likely  
 agree that people who do not back the state’s  policies should live elsewhere, people 
should support policies simply because they are the policies of the country, people 
should avoid saying bad things about the country, their state is always correct in 
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matters of international affairs, and that the country has the moral high ground in 
policymaking. 	  
 5) Economic Performance Perceptions:  Respondents scoring high on this  
 factor tend to agree to four survey questions asking whether their own and the 
country’s economy performed better in the past year and would do so in the next year. 
Observed Variables: 
 1) Partisan Identification:  Dichotomous variables capture whether, in the   
 U.S., the respondent is a Democrat or Republican, and, in the U.K., whether  
 the respondent is a supporter of Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal   
 Democrats, the Greens, UKIP, or one of the two nationalist parties (Scottish  
 Nationalists or Plaid Cyrmu). 
 2) Other Controls: The estimations below consider or control for the impact  
 of the following social-demographic variables on attitudes towards China:   
 age, gender, university education or not, region (South in the US, Wales and  
 Scotland in the UK), religious denomination (Protestant/Church of England,  
 Catholic, other Christian, other religion), income (via dichotomous high and  
 middle income controls) and race (African-American, Hispanic, and Asian in  
 the US, non-white in the UK).	  
 
Methods 	  
 Conducting valid cross-cultural multivariate analyses to compare American and 
British attitudes towards China first requires determining whether the factor structure of the 
hypothesized latent covariates is similar enough to argue that their meaning is roughly 
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equivalent across the two states (see Davidov et al. 2011). Multiple-group analysis in a CFA 
framework is the method used to establish this validity (Byrne 2012).	  
 The second step is, for each country, to estimate simultaneously via ordered probit the 
two toughness variables on the factors, partisan identification and control variables. One of 
our key interests is the degree to which respondents bring different judgments to bear on 
getting tough with China on economic and military matters. To examine this question, we 
tested whether the co-variation between independent and dependent variables are statistically 
equivalent to one another across the two policy spaces. To more easily see when and where 
there is (and is not) a discernible difference in how independent variables are associated with 
the two dependent variables we use equality constraints. If an equality constraint is warranted 
(that is, the independent variable has the same effect on economic toughness as it does on 
military toughness), the table reports a single coefficient in a country. If the independent 
variable has an unequal effect on the economic and military dependent variables, the table 
reports two coefficients. By doing this, we can more clearly see which variables affect support 
for economic and military toughness differently, and where a variable is just generally 
associated with greater toughness towards China.5 To foreshadow our results, most of the 
time we can impose an equality constraint—that is the independent variable in question 
affects economic and military toughness equally (this is true on all variables for the UK 
sample, and all but three variables for the US sample).	  
 The final step is to determine the degree to which affect towards China, as represented 
by a feeling thermometer, mediates the relationship between postures and policy. If citizen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 More specifically, we are using seemingly unrelated ordered probit (SOP) with equality constraints. In 
other words, we are simultaneously running two ordered probit models and testing the equivalence of 
slopes across these two models. SOP models also allow the error terms of the two ordinal outcome 
variables to covary. Efficiency gains are obtained in simultaneous estimation (Kennedy 2003).  
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attitudes about the policies the US and UK governments should pursue towards China are 
mostly caused by general affect towards China, the addition of the feeling thermometer as a 
predictor should render the coefficients for the direct paths between the threat variables and 
substantive variables insignificant. 	  
	  
Results:	  
Evaluations of China:	  
 The February 2013 surveys ask British and American respondents to evaluate a 
number of countries on the 101 point feeling thermometer, and the average score those in the 
survey give to each country appears in Figure 1. Citizens of both states feel cool towards 
China. Not surprisingly, they feel warmest towards their own country and generally feel more 
warm than cool towards Canada. The European countries in the feeling thermometer battery 
receive relatively high scores. At the opposite end of the spectrum lay two Arab states in the 
midst of turmoil, Egypt and Libya. Americans rate China lower than Egypt (t=-2.60, p<0.01) 
while the British are more generous towards the former than the latter but still cool (t=9.09, 
p<0.001). In short, most peoples of both states are not Sinophiles. 	  
[Figure 1 about Here]	  
 Respondents from both countries also desire their politicians to pursue a “tough” 
China policy. Tables 1a and 1b provide distributions for the two main dependent variables of 
interest. Comparing across the two countries, the key difference is that Americans are prone 
to believe that tough China policies in the economic and military arenas are “very” instead of 
“somewhat” important. British responses cluster in the latter category, and they are slightly 
more likely than Americans to declare that tough China policies are “not too important”.	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 [Tables1a and 1b about Here] 	  
 Britons and Americans are slightly more supportive of tough economic and trade 
policies towards China than they are of placing importance on their country taking tough 
military stances against this state. However, the take away point is that support for tough 
policies pervades both policy realms. Although the response distributions are significantly 
different from one another in both countries, the polychoric correlations are 0.74 in the UK 
and 0.79 in the US.	  
Factor Structure:	  
Before multivariate analyses to test the above hypotheses commence, it is imperative to 
obtain scores of the latent variables that are valid within countries and functionally equivalent 
across states . Table 2 presents the results of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) where the 
unstandardized factor loadings and thresholds on the ordinal responses to the survey questions 
are constrained to be equal across countries. As is evident from the Table, the standardized 
factor loadings are strong, and the fit of the model, while not exact (χ2WLSMV=1541.214, 
p<0.001), approximately matches the data structure (RMSEA=0.04) even when equality 
constraints are placed on the loadings.6  This approximate fit suggests that the “meanings” of 
the latent variables—the three postures, the measure of patriotism/ethnocentrism, and 
economic evaluations, are the same across the two states  and valid cross-country 
comparisons are possible. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Standardized loadings differ slightly across states  because the co-variances between the latent variables and 
indicators are allowed to vary freely across countries . Notable differences include the fact that Isolationism has 
a small negative correlation with militarism (-0.09) in the US but the two latent variables have a small positive 
association in the UK (0.19). There is a moderate negative correlation between militarism and economic well-
being in the US, but this relationship does not obtain in the UK. Full results for the CFA are available upon 
request. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation is a commonly employed approximate fit statistic 
employed in Structural Equation Modelling, and scores of below 0.05 are judged to have very good near fit 
(Byrne 2012).  
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[Table 2 about here]	  
Differences in latent means tests suggest that Britons are more militaristic (0.241), believe 
that globalisation has a positive impact (0.244), and, surprisingly, more patriotic (0.207) than 
Americans. Circa early 2013, British economic outlooks, however, are much more negative (-
0.735).7	  
Direct Relationship:	  
 For each country, the two toughness variables simultaneously are regressed on the 
factors, whose valid structure derives from Table 2, as well as partisanship and socio-
demographic controls. In a first step, the estimations of the magnitudes of the coefficients for 
the latent and observed covariates can vary across the two outcome variables measuring the 
importance respondents place on their state pursuing tough economic and military policies 
towards China. One by one, equality constraints on coefficients and χ2WLSMV difference tests 
determine whether the fit of the model declines when the assumption that the independent 
variables have an equal effect on each of the outcome variables is in force. Table 3 presents 
the standardised coefficients from the final estimations.8	  
[Table 3 about here]	  
 In the United Kingdom, constraining all coefficients to be equal across the two 
simultaneous ordered probit estimations results in a model that fits the data no worse than 
does an output where the magnitude of any of the coefficients vary. This suggests that the 
impact of each of the covariates on the degree of toughness respondents prefer in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Factor scores have a range from -2.257 to 2.304. American latent variable means are fixed to zero to allow for 
comparisons. 
8 Interpret the standardised continuous independent covariates such that a one standard deviation unit change in 
the covariate associates with a slope change in the underlying latent response to the categorical toughness 
variables. For the binary independent variables, a move from 0 to 1 corresponds to a slope change in the 
underlying latent response to the categorical toughness variables. Coefficients obtained via the ordered probit 
WLSMV estimator in Mplus 7.3. 
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economic and trade and military policy realms is equivalent. We discuss the implications of 
this finding in the section below. 	  
 Militarists in the UK want the Government to pursue tougher China policies, and, 
although support for globalisation and trade co-varies with favouring softer China policies, 
the militarism latent variable is the stronger predictor. The most relevant substantive variable, 
however, is the respondents’ positions on the general isolationism dimension. Those sceptical 
of foreign entanglements do not want the British Government to pursue an aggressive China 
policy. Finally, those scoring high on patriotism find a tougher policy more palatable. In 
terms of the control variables, adherents to the Church of England and Catholic faiths as well 
as those practicing non-Christian religions are more favourable to a tougher stance towards 
China than those who do not belong to a church. University educated respondents are less 
bellicose than those with less than a bachelor’s degree and men want a less confrontational 
policy towards China both in the military and economic and trade arenas.9  Partisanship is not 
a significant predictor of the level of toughness the survey respondents’ desire. Despite their 
significance in a number of instances, the explanatory power of the predictor variables is 
modest, and the R2 of each of the latent variables underlying the ordinal toughness scales are 
just over 0.10.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The large gender gap suggesting British women to be significantly more likely to want to follow a tough 
China policy is curious and a potential area for future research. On the one hand, much of the feminist 
literature argues that women are more pacifistic than men, but studies of foreign policy attitude qualify 
this assertion. In her study of Denmark, Togeby (1994) notes that gender gaps in foreign policy attitudes 
only emerge in the presence of left wing and feminist mobilization. In their comparative study of feminist 
identities, Hayes et al. (2000) note that British women were no more likely than men to support feminist 
issues and were significantly less likely than American women to be classified as feminists according to the 
responses they provided on the cross-national World Values Studies. In short, a potential reason for the 
above finding that women in Great Britain actually are more bellicose towards China might be the 
antipathy towards feminism observed among British women, but this is speculative. 
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 The American story has important nuanced differences. The magnitudes of a majority 
of the coefficients are equivalent across the economic and trade and military toughness 
estimations. Hawkish beliefs have the strongest impact on the demand for toughness in both. 
However, the impact of believing globalisation is a net positive has a far stronger impact on 
the desire for a less tough US economic policy towards China. Favouring globalisation 
remains a significant predictor of a less aggressive military policy, but the strength of this 
latent variable on this estimation is muted. Somewhat surprisingly, those high on patriotism 
are slightly less inclined to see an aggressive economic policy towards China, but the impact 
of this latent predictor on military policy is insignificant. Finally, confidence in one’s own 
and America’s economic condition suggests a desire for tough policies towards China across 
multiple policy realms.10	  
 Unlike the results for the United Kingdom, older Americans are far more supportive 
than the young of taking a tough line towards China, and the impact is the same across policy 
domains. Members of all minority groups want to see the US pursue softer policies towards 
China, and unlike the United Kingdom, there appear to be partisan differences in policy 
demands between Republicans and Democrats. The former see tough policies as more 
important while the latter favour less aggressive stances. Protestants and Catholics also want 
tougher US policies towards China. A key difference between the estimations across the two 
samples is the fact that the covariates included in the American estimations are able to explain 
much more variation in the desire Americans have for tough policies towards China, both 
militarily and economically. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This finding that economic optimism co-varies with a more aggressive foreign policy serves as a nice 
companion point to recent research showing that poor economic conditions associate with isolationist sentiment 
(Kertzer 2013). We return to this point in the mediation analysis below.  
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Thermometer as a Mediator:	  
Given the similarity of the importance the British and American public’s place on the 
toughness of their governments’ China policies across disparate policy domains, it is a fair 
question to ask whether the responses people give to the two outcome variables of interest 
simply are reflective of general attitudes towards China. To partially test this, we regress the 
two threat variables onto a question asking respondents to evaluate China on a 0-100 
thermometer scale and the above covariates.11 To capture indirect effects, the feeling 
thermometer additionally is regressed on the covariates. 	  
Table 4 reports the results of the estimations of the two toughness variables on the 
latent covariates in the presence of the feeling thermometer acting as a mediator. As one 
would expect, some of the effects of our variables are mediated by our measure of affect 
towards China. Nonetheless, our variables continue to exert direct effects on support for 
toughness towards China. 	  
Results from the estimation in Table 4 show that only a small proportion of the effect 
of Militarism operates indirectly.12  In contrast, a much larger proportion of the effect of 
globalisation is mediated by the China feeling thermometer. Interestingly, in the US 
estimation, there is not a significant direct effect from beliefs about globalisation on desires 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 We are cautious in stating that we only partially test mediation because there can be a number of other 
potential mediators and the extent to which omitted mediators are correlated with the thermometer can lead to 
the overestimation of the importance of the thermometer’s role as a mediator. However, a thermometer is broad 
and all encompassing, requiring less intellectual engagement than more specific questions about the Chinese 
government, communism, and mediators used in other research (see Gries 2014b). A number of other challenges 
exist in testing for mediation; see Green et al. (2010). 
12 Equality constraints are removed in the estimations presented in Table 4. However, the substantive findings 
concerning the changes in the magnitude of the direct effects after the thermometer is added hold regardless of 
whether the model is estimated with or without constraints. For example, rerunning the estimations presented in 
Table 3 without the model constraints yields standardized coefficients for the Militarism variable of 0.168 on 
toughness on Economics and Trade and 0.122 for toughness in military matters in the UK. Most of the effect of 
Militarism is direct regardless of constraints employed.  
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for a tough military policy, but the direct effect is significant and quite strong when it comes 
down to preferences for a tough economic policy. 	  
[Table 4 about here]	  
Another interesting result emerges concerning perceptions of the economy—the direct 
and indirect effects run in opposite directions. Even after accounting for standard 
demographic controls that capture household income, those confident about the economy feel 
warmer towards China, which depresses support for toughness. But positive economic 
evaluations maintain a significant and substantively large direct effect for support for getting 
tough with China. In other words, more positive economic outlooks appear to coincide with a 
more outward and aggressive looking foreign policy—but this is tempered by the more 
positive feelings towards China that also come with more upbeat economic assessments.	  
The direct and indirect effects of partisanship in the United States are not described in 
the table but warrant attention. The divide between Republicans and Democrats exists 
because the former believe it is important for the US government to pursue tougher economic 
and military policies towards China. Democratic partisanship does not directly affect the 
China policy positions—the mediation analysis suggests the significant coefficients for 
Democratic partisanship on display in Table 3 are an artefact of Democrats feeling warmer 
towards China as a whole. Likewise, the racial disparities in policy preferences we see in the 
US in Table 3 are likely a function of the fact that minorities feel warmer towards China 
rather than any differences in their foreign policy preferences. The effect of age, however, is 
mostly direct. Older people in the United States place greater importance on the government 
pursuing tougher policies towards China.	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In the United Kingdom most of the effect of gender on policies is direct—men want a 
more friendly approach towards China. Further, the demands for a tougher approach towards 
China among religious adherents are not filtered through the thermometer. The role of 
partisanship remains insignificant.	  
 	  
Discussion 	  
 This paper constitutes a unique opportunity to explore the specific foreign policy 
attitudes of Americans and Britons in direct, side-by-side, comparative way. The distributions 
of our key outcome variables, citizen preferences for tough state China policies in the 
economic and military spheres as well as a chosen mediator—general citizen affect for 
China—demonstrates a great deal of concern about China’s rise as a global power. Britons 
and Americans are wont to favour tough policies, the latter more so. Those on both sides of 
the “Special Relationship” view China coolly in comparison to their western allies. With this 
information in mind, we construct a set of rival hypotheses to better understand the root 
covariates of this scepticism. In short, we ask whether broad and abstract foreign policy 
postures, coupled with variables standard in models of political choice (economic evaluations 
and partisanship), co-vary with the specific attitudes British and American citizens have about 
the level of policy toughness their country should exhibit in their economic and military 
policies for China. A summary of our hypotheses and findings appears in Table 5.	  
[Table 5 about Here]	  
 In both states there is support for Hurwitz and Peffley’s (1987) core argument that 
abstract foreign policy postures can explain variation in the more specific aspects of foreign 
policy citizens want their country to pursue. A key posture in the hierarchical model, ours and 
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theirs, militarism, associates strongly with British and American demands for a tough 
response to the rise of China. Another, isolationism, makes Britons shy away from 
preferences for getting tough with China, likely because they view such actions as needlessly 
provocative. Support for globalisation or preferences for free trade also reduce preferences for 
tough policies in both states. 	  
 Moving away from examining the role of the foreign policy postures that accord with 
those found in the work of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), we also find that a key domestic 
variable—partisanship, works as expected. The greater level of partisan polarisation present 
in the US leads partisan identifiers in this country to be more divided on responses to China 
than the British. A curious finding emerges concerning the relationship between evaluations 
of personal and economic finances and demands for a tough China policy in the United States 
(the direct and total relationships are insignificant in the UK sample). Americans who are 
bullish about the economy feel warmer towards China, but also want tough policies instituted 
towards this country . We believe this makes sense—economic prosperity leads one to 
embrace a more outward and bold foreign policy (mirroring Kertzer’s (2013) research 
showing that economic decline leads to preferences for an inward looking foreign policy). At 
the same time, economic prosperity leads one to view China more favourably, which 
decreases support for tough China policies. Further research is necessary to determine how 
robust is this finding (there is only minimal support for the indirect relationship in the UK) 
and whether it is unique to situations where citizens have clear preferences and attitudes 
towards target countries. The other curious findings that needs further exploration is the small 
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but significant positive relationship between patriotism and the belief that the US should not 
be tough towards China in the economic and trade policy realm.13	  
 Results from testing rival hypotheses and making cross-country  comparisons also are 
indirectly suggestive of the level of sophistication citizens have when answering questions 
about specific policies. Postures can be informative shortcuts, but only if the postures are 
well-formulated and citizens can make the association between them and the specific policy 
under scrutiny. Results from Table 2 suggest citizens in both countries  have clearly 
formulated abstract beliefs about foreign policy that are cross-culturally valid. That the 
postures in both states  have a direct relationship with the toughness variables without a need 
for mediation is evidence of higher order thinking. But we would be remiss to not point out 
that the relationship appears stronger in the United States. Unlike Britons, American 
respondents also are more likely to, albeit in limited circumstances, utilize different postures 
for different policy aims. Although foreign policy often is remote from the day-to-day lives of 
citizens in both countries  the coverage and consequences of China’s rise is more apparent for 
Americans. Thus, it does not surprise that the postures and other independent variables do a 
better job at explaining American responses than they do in the UK and that, unlike their 
British counterparts, interviewees from the US utilize different postures in coming to 
conclusions about economic and military policies towards China. 	  
	  
Conclusions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 One potential explanation is that uncritical patriots tend to be those who believe their country can do no 
wrong. If one is hesitant to criticise one’s country, one might also be reticent to believe that their state’s policies 
were too “soft”. 
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This paper makes several primary contributions to the literature on public opinion on 
matters of foreign policy. First, it explores the important area of attitudes towards China in 
two key Western states. Second, the paper moves beyond the American case to explore the 
similarities and differences in opinion formation on matters of foreign policy among the 
British and American publics in the sources of their attitudes towards China. Third, this paper 
shows that foreign policy variables continue to play a powerful role in shaping China attitudes 
even after controlling for simpler heuristics such as country feeling thermometers, 
partisanship, and economic perceptions.	  
Comparing public opinion across countries is difficult because it is easy to question 
the cross-cultural validity of the hypothesized constructs (cf. Davidov et al. 2011). We show 
that even though average scores across countries may differ, Americans and Britons 
conceptualise postures or dimensions of foreign policy attitudes (militarism, 
isolationism/internationalism, and globalisation), patriotism, and economic evaluations in a 
similar manner. This finding helps reassure us that the variables take on a comparable 
meaning across states, and thus has positive implications for future research on opinion 
formation on matters of foreign policymaking in the United States and United Kingdom. 
Although the findings presented in Table 2 should be replicated, it does appear that key 
foreign policy postures are valid in both countries . It remains a question whether the cross-
cultural validity we find the postures to have hold when comparing more dissimilar states  
such as Japan to the United Kingdom, France to Australia, and so forth. Seeing if this finding 
holds across a larger set of countries  is paramount to the cross-cultural study of public 
opinion on matters of foreign policy. 	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Our argument is that US-UK differences are rooted in the greater salience of China as 
a political issue in the US. Different factors likely contribute to this greater salience--the  
greater coverage of the rise of China in the US media, the visible presence of Chinese 
products on the shelves of American stores as well as Britain’s lack of military interests in the 
Asia-Pacific and concern with the European Union. This analysis still leaves fundamental 
questions unanswered, and our data alone cannot answer them. Is the greater media coverage 
about China in the US the cause of greater China salience, or a consequence of greater China 
salience? Does the US’s role as economic and military role as superpower make China a 
bigger issue because the US could choose to challenge her, whereas more limited British 
resources simply keep this off the table for the UK? Of course we expect the opposite as well-
-issues that are higher salience in the UK should also result in more nuanced and separable 
evaluations among the British public across dimensions that we would find in America. If we 
were to compare American and British attitudes towards the European Union—we should do 
a better job explaining British respondents should do a better job at predicting specific 
policies on this matter whereas we would see American’s more prone to not know the answer 
to the question or answer randomly. For example, 	  
The linking of postures to specific attitudes and noting their points of variation across 
states using the issue of China in two policy realms is just the tip of what can be a wider 
cross-cultural project to link individuals’ foreign policy postures to their response to specific 
and often remote foreign policy issues. In the United States, our results show that postures 
tied to elements of hard (militarism) and soft (globalisation) power are key predictors of 
American beliefs concerning the importance of their country’s tough policies towards China 
in the military and economic policy realms. The impact these postures have on specific 
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policies is mostly direct and, contra the results suggested by previous work, quasi-ideological 
postures do not need to work through the simpler heuristic of general attitudes towards a 
country to motivate specific policy responses. For respondents from the US, there is also 
some (but not much) differentiation across the two policy domains under observation. In the 
United Kingdom, where the relevance of China is lower, it is the broader posture of 
isolationism that plays the largest role, and the China feeling thermometer is more of a 
relevant mediator. More exploration should be done as to whether people’s opinions toward 
specific aspects of their country’s foreign policies towards another state are a function of 
specific or broad postures. A separate cross-country concern is the extent to which the 
different electoral systems (one candidate centered, one party centered) connect the public’s 
China preferences to government policy--is there an electoral connection on the issue of 
China (see Aldrich et al 2006).	  
Lastly, returning to China, the fact that our multivariate models exhibit more 
explanatory power when the American sample is considered suggests that American 
policymakers have a bit less free space to maneuverer when it comes to setting policy. While 
it is unlikely that slight shifts in America’s China policy will swing a presidential election, a 
move against the will of the American voters may lead them to question, ever so slightly, the 
competence of their leaders. In the United Kingdom, this is less likely to be the case but still 
possible. Ultimately, a larger research programme will more firmly link citizens’ positions on 
specific postures and the ensuing positions on specific policy beliefs to behaviour and 
attitudes towards the politicians who make policy. This is a small piece in the puzzle of what 
hopefully will emerge into a larger research programme. 	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Table	  1a:	  Thinking	  about	  UK	  Policy	  towards	  China,	  do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  tough	  with	  
China	  on…	  
	   Economic	  and	  Trade	  Issues	   Military	  Issues	  
No,	  Not	  at	  all	  important	   1%	   2%	  
No,	  Not	  too	  important	   15	   16	  
Yes,	  Somewhat	  Important	   58	   52	  
Yes,	  Very	  Important	   26	   30	  
Χ2=12.64	  (3df,	  p=0.005)	   100%	  (weighted	  n=1468)	   100%	  (weighted	  n=	  1460)	  
	   Mean=3.10	  Std.	  Dev.=0.66	   Mean=3.10	  Std.	  Dev.=0.72	  
Note: Variables treated as ordinal in multivariate analyses	  
	  
Table	  1b:	  Thinking	  about	  US	  policy	  towards	  China,	  do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  tough	  with	  
China	  on…	  
	   Economics	  and	  Trade	  Issues	   Military	  Issues	  
No,	  Not	  at	  all	  important	   2%	   2%	  
No,	  Not	  too	  important	   6	   8	  
Yes,	  Somewhat	  Important	   41	   43	  
Yes,	  Very	  Important	   51	   47	  
Χ2=11.56	  (3df,	  p=0.009)	   100%	  (weighted	  n=1643)	   100%	  (weighted	  n=1575)	  
	   Mean=3.42	  Std.	  Dev.=0.69	   Mean=3.35	  Std.	  Dev.=0.70	  
Note:	  Variables	  treated	  as	  ordinal	  in	  multivariate	  analyses	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Table 2: Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model of independent variables	  
Latent factor	   Indicator 	   UK	   US	  
Militarism	   Strong Military to Be Effective In IR.	   0.79	   0.69	  
	   Increase Military Spending	   0.81	   0.87	  
	   	   	   	  
Globalisation Positive Effect 
On	   UK/US Factory Workers	   0.64	   0.77	  
	   Respondent and Family	   0.81	   0.85	  
	   UK/US Economy	   0.89	   0.93	  
	   Avg. UK/US Consumer	   0.81	   0.82	  
	   UK/US Businesses	   0.86	   0.79	  
	   	   	   	  
Isolationism/Internationalism	   UK/US Interests Protected by Avoiding Involvement	   0.81	   0.82	  
	   UK/US Shouldn’t Risk Citizen Happiness by Involvement	   0.74	   0.74	  
	   UK/US Mind Own Business When It Comes to International Affairs	   0.79	   0.82	  
	   	   	   	  
Economic Evaluations	   Economic Performance of Country in Past 12 Months	   0.8	   0.89	  
	   Personal Finances in Last 12 Months	   0.69	   0.68	  
	   Personal Finances in Next 12 Months	   0.75	   0.75	  
	   Economic Situation of Country in Next 12 Months	   0.85	   0.88	  
	   	   	   	  
Patriotism	   People who do not support UK/US should live elsewhere	   0.68	   0.77	  
	   I support UK/US policies for the very reason they are policies of my country.	   0.74	   0.75	  
	   There is already enough criticism of UK/US abroad…don’t say bad things.	   0.62	   0.71	  
	   In international affairs, UK/US virtually always right.	   0.74	   0.79	  
	   UK/US policies always the morally correct ones.	   0.77	   0.79	  
	      
Notes: Estimation of ordinal indicators via the WLSMV estimator as implemented in Mplus 7.3. Factor loadings 
are standardized; unstandardized factor loadings constrained to equivalence. Overall fit of the model: 
χ2=1541.214 (338df); RMSEA 0.04; CFI=0.94. χ2 Contribution from UK group=705.568 and χ2 Contribution 
from US group=835.646.	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Table 3: Covariates of Economic and Military Toughness, United Kingdom and United States	  
	   Seemingly unrelated probit (with equality constraints)	  
Predictor	  
	  
United Kingdom	  
Economic & Military 
Toughness	  
United States  
Economic 
toughness	  
United States 
Military 
toughness	  
Militarism	   0.150***	  
(0.038)	  
0.346***	  
(0.049)	  
Globalisation	   -0.088*	  
(0.040)	  
-0.225**	  
(0.040)	  
-0.108**	  
(0.040)	  
Isolationism/Internationalism	   -0.170***	  
(0.040)	  
0.009	  
(0.035)	  
Economic Evaluations	   -0.009	  
(0.039)	  
0.091*	  
(0.036)	  
Patriotism	   0.094*	  
(0.041)	  
-0.102*	  
(0.047)	  
0.040	  
(0.047)	  
Age	   0.015	  
(0.053)	  
0.233***	  
(0.037)	  
Non-White British/ African American	   -0.010	  
(0.096)	  
-0.215†	  
(0.128)	  
Hispanic American	   --	   -0.238†	  
(0.136)	  
Asian American	   --	   -0.633**	  
(0.215)	  
University Educated	   -0.210*	  
(0.088)	  
-0.107	  
(0.070)	  
Church of England/Protestant	   0.282*	  
(0.110)	  
0.231*	  
(0.094)	  
Catholic	   0.300*	  
(0.141)	  
0.175†	  
(0.105)	  
Other Christian	   0.116	  
(0.131)	  
0.173	  
(0.119)	  
Other Religion	   0.356***	  
(0.105)	  
0.092	  
(0.140)	  
Scotland	   0.086	  
(0.122)	   	  
Wales	   0.070	  
(0.167)	   	  
South USA	   --	   0.023	  
(0.071)	  
High Income	   0.090	  
(0.115)	  
-0.004	  
(0.088)	  
Middle Income	   -0.032	  
(0.119)	  
0.097	  
(0.085)	  
Male	   -0.251***	  
(0.077)	  
0.052	  
(0.078)	  
-0.082	  
(0.075)	  
Conservative (UK) / Republican (US) Identifier 	   -0.032	  
(0.112)	  
0.234**	  
(0.080)	  
Labour Identifier (UK) / Democratic (US) Identifier	   -0.070	  
(0.104)	  
-0.145† 
(0.086)	  
Liberal Democrat Identifier (UK only)	   -0.083	  
(0.150)	   	  
UKIP Identifier (UK only)	   -0.152	  
(0.155)	   	   	  
Plaid Cyrmu/SNP Identifier (UK only)	   0.414	  
(0.284)	   	   	  
Green Identifier (UK only)	   0.216	  
(0.191)	   	   	  
R2	   0.107	   0.274	   0.268	  
†p<0.10 *** p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05. Notes: Simultaneous unrelated ordered probit estimation via the WLSMV estimator as 
implemented in Mplus 7.3. Latent predictors are indicated in boldface. While we are simultaneously estimating two ordered probit models 
for each country, we only report a single coefficient when slopes are equivalent across models. All UK predictors constrained to equality. US 
predictors constrained to equality for all variables except Globalisation, Patriotism, and Male. UK n=1891, US n=1859. Difference Test for 
UK equality constraints (vs. unconstrained model): χ2=24.286(df=23) p=0.388. Difference Test for imposed US equality constraints (vs. 
unconstrained model): χ2=14.087(df=17) p=0.661 Standardized coefficients displayed. 	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Table 4: Direct and Indirect Effects of Selected Predictors on Preferences for Tough Policy via a China Feeling 
Thermometer	  
Predictor	   UK Economic and 
Trade	  
UK Military	   US Economic and 
Trade	  
US Military	  
Militarism	  
  Direct:	  
  Indirect:	  
  Total:	  
	  
0.140***	  
0.030**	  
0.170***	  
	  
0.093*	  
0.029**	  
0.123**	  
	  
0.311***	  
0.036*	  
0.348**	  
	  
0.307***	  
0.036**	  
0.343***	  
Globalisation	  
  Direct:	  
  Indirect:	  
  Total:	  
	  
-0.046	  
-0.043***	  
-0.088**	  
	  
-0.048	  
-0.041***	  
-0.089***	  
	  
-0.178***	  
-0.056***	  
-0.234***	  
	  
-0.042	  
-0.055***	  
-0.097*	  
Isolationism	  
  Direct:	  
  Indirect:	  
  Total:	  
	  
-0.129**	  
-0.008	  
-0.138**	  
	  
-0.193***	  
-0.008	  
-0.201***	  
	  
0.011	  
0.003	  
0.014	  
	  
0.003	  
0.003	  
0.006	  
Econ. Eval.	  
  Direct:	  
  Indirect:	  
  Total:	  
	  
-0.005	  
-0.022*	  
-0.017	  
	  
0.023	  
-0.021*	  
0.002	  
	  
0.160***	  
-0.050***	  
0.110**	  
	  
0.121***	  
-0.050***	  
0.071†	  
Patriotism	  
  Direct:	  
  Indirect:	  
  Total:	  
	  
0.089*	  
0.002	  
0.091*	  
	  
0.092*	  
0.002	  
0.094*	  
	  
-0.081†	  
-0.017	  
-0.097*	  
	  
0.052	  
-0.016	  
0.035	  
Notes: Standardized coefficients reported †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***0.001. Coefficients obtained after 
WLSMV estimation in Mplus 7.3. Ordered probit estimation of military and economic threat variables onto 
covariates. Least squares regression estimation of feeling thermometer onto covariates. Standard errors of 
coefficients and other parameters available upon request.	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Table 5:  Summary of hypotheses and results	  
Hypothesis	   Finding	  
H1: Higher levels of isolationism present among respondents from 
the United States and Great Britain co-varies with a reduced 
propensity to support the government pursing tough military and 
economic policies towards China.	  
Supported in the UK 	  
H2: Respondents’ positions on the militarism dimension are more 
closely tied to their preferences for a tough state military policy 
towards China than they are for a tough economic policy.	  
Not supported.	  
H3: Respondent support for globalisation has a significant and 
negative association with their preferences for a tough state  
economic policy towards  China. The magnitude of this linkage is 
larger than the relationship between globalisation and preferences 
for a tough military policy. 	  
Fully supported in the US. 
Significant but weak relationship 
that is equal across policy domains 
in the UK	  
H4: The long term attachments of Americans to a political party, as 
represented by their responses to a standard partisan identification 
question, will significantly influence the degree of toughness they 
seek from their country’s China policies—Democratic respondents 
will favour a softer approach while Republicans will demand 
toughness. In Great Britain, respondents’ partisan affiliations will 
have little direct effect on attitudes towards the approach the UK 
government should take towards China.	  
Fully supported in the UK. Mostly 
supported in the US. Strong direct 
relationship between Republican 
partisanship and preferences for 
toughness. Relationship between 
Democratic identification and 
support for tough policies mediated 
by measure of affect towards China.	  
H5: Economic evaluations affect support for toughness on China. 
Those who have more negative evaluations of the economy or 
household finances will support greater toughness towards China.	  
Supported in US; not supported in 
UK. (However, refer to text and 
Table 4 for interesting 
countervailing direct and indirect 
effects.)	  
H6: Economic evaluations affect support for toughness on China. 
Those who have more negative evaluations of the economy or 
household finances will support greater toughness towards China.	  
Supported in the UK; not supported 
in the US	  
H7: Respondents’ support for a tough China policy in 
both the economic and military policy realms operates 
via is a function of general affect towards China.	  
Mostly supported. There are 
meaningful indirect effects that 
operate via general attitudes 
towards China. However, in some 
cases the direct effect is more 
powerful than the indirect effect via 
the feeling thermometer. There is 
also an interesting countervailing 
indirect effect for economic 
evaluations in the US.	  
H8:  The covariates described in this section will have better 
explanatory power in explaining citizen preferences for tough 
China policies in the United States than in Great Britain.	  
	  
Supported.	  
H9: Americans will utilize different postures to inform their foreign 
policy preferences towards China in the economic and military 
domains while the influence of the postures will be more even 
across the two policies among the less informed British 
respondents. 	  
Supported	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Online	  Appendix	  Tables:	  	  	  
Sampling	  Information	  
United	  States:	  	  All	  questions	  utilized	  in	  this	  paper	  were	  from	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  a	  panel	  survey	  and	  
1,994	  (out	  of	  an	  initial	  2862)	  respondents	  participated	  in	  this	  wave.	  Demographic	  characteristics	  
derived	  from	  the	  2010	  American	  Community	  Survey	  were	  utilised	  for	  post-­‐sampling	  weighting.	  Initial	  
matching	  to	  draw	  a	  fresh	  sample	  for	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  the	  panel	  was	  done	  utilizing	  demographic	  
information	  from	  the	  2007	  American	  Community	  Survey.	  This	  table	  describes	  the	  percentages	  
obtained	  from	  a	  probability	  based	  sampling	  and	  utilized	  for	  weighting	  and	  the	  actual	  observed	  
sample	  percentages:	  
	  
	   	   Population	  Estimate	   Wave	  3	  Sample-­‐-­‐Actual	  
Gender	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Male	   48.5	   	   46.5	   	  
	   Female	   51.5	   	   53.5	   	  
	   	   100	   	   100	   	  
Age	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   18-­‐29	   22	   	   6.8	   	  
	   30-­‐44	   26.1	   	   19.8	   	  
	   45-­‐64	   34.7	   	   49.6	   	  
	   65+	   17.2	   	   23.8	   	  
	   	   100	   	   100	   	  
Race	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   White	   66.9	   	   77.5	   	  
	   Black	   11.7	   	   8.6	   	  
	   Hispanic	   14.4	   	   7.2	   	  
	   Other	   7	   	   6.7	   	  
	   	   100	   	   100	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Education	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   HS	  or	  less	   43.4	   	   36.5	   	  
	   Some	  College	   30.9	   	   31.1	   	  
	   College	  Grad	   16.5	   	   18.8	   	  
	   Post	  Grad	   9.1	   	   13.5	   	  
	   	   99.9	   	   99.9	   	  
	  
	  	  	  
	  
United	  Kingdom:	  	  All	  questions	  utilized	  in	  this	  paper	  were	  from	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  a	  panel	  survey	  and	  
2,014	  	  (out	  of	  an	  initial	  2760)	  respondents	  participated	  in	  this	  wave.	  Demographic	  characteristics	  
derived	  from	  the	  National	  Readership	  Survey	  were	  utilised	  for	  post-­‐sampling	  weighting.	  This	  table	  
describes	  the	  percentages	  obtained	  from	  a	  probability	  based	  sampling	  and	  utilized	  for	  weighting	  and	  
the	  actual	  observed	  sample	  percentages:	  
	  
Weighting	  variables	   Population	  Estimate	   Wave	  3	  
Sample	  
Actual	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Age	  and	  Gender	   	  	   	   	   	  
Male	  18-­‐24	   6.2	   	   	   0.8	  
Male	  25-­‐39	   12.8	   	   	   7.4	  
Male	  40-­‐59	   16.9	   	   	   21.7	  
Male	  60+	   12.7	   	   	   17.2	  
Female	  18-­‐24	   5.9	   	   	   0.9	  
Female	  25-­‐39	   12.7	   	   	   10.1	  
Female	  40-­‐59	   17.3	   	   	   22.4	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Female	  60+	   15.5	   	   	   19.5	  
	   	  	   	   	   	  
Social	  Grade	   	  	   	   	   	  
AB	   28	   	   	   37.8	  
C1	   29	   	   	   26.2	  
C2	   21	   	   	   15.4	  
DE	   22	   	   	   20.7	  
	   	  	   	   	   	  
Newspaper	  readership	   	  	   	   	   	  
Express	  /	  Mail	   16	   	   	   20.7	  
Sun	  /	  Star	   23.5	   	   	   7.9	  
Mirror/Record	   10	   	   	   6.5	  
Guardian	  /	  Indy	   4.5	   	   	   6.3	  
FT	  /	  Times	  /	  Teleg.	   9.5	   	   	   4.1	  
Other	   11.5	   	   	   16.8	  
No	  paper	   25	   	   	   37.7	  
	   	  	   	   	   	  
Region	   	  	   	   	   	  
North	   24.6	   	   	   21.2	  
Midlands	   16.4	   	   	   14.3	  
East	   9.6	   	   	   9.8	  
London	   12.8	   	   	   18	  
South	   22.9	   	   	   23.4	  
Wales	   5	   	   	   3.9	  
Scotland	   8.7	   	   	   9	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Exact	  Question	  wording	  and	  Response	  Distributions	  to	  Latent	  Variable	  	  
Indicators:	  
Note: Response distributions are weighted and derive from data employed to 
obtain estimates presented in Table 2. In the estimations, the variables 
are treated as measured at the ordinal level. 	  
Latent Variable: Militarism (From November 2011 Wave of Survey)	  
1. The US/UK Needs a strong military to be effective in international 
relations.*	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US 	   30.4%	   36.6	   20.5	   9.0	   3.5	   97.7%	  
UK 	   19.7%	   42.7	   26.2	   9.3	   2.1	   96.7%	  
	  
2. Do you think that we should increase our spending on the military, keep 
it about the same, or cut it back? 	  
	   Increase	   Keep Same	   Decrease	   Percent of 
Cases Present	  
US	   17.0%	   42.7	   40.0	   92.8%	  
UK	   37.0%	   47.0	   16.0	   92.3%	  
	  
Latent Variable:  Globalisation (From May/June 2012 Wave of Survey)	  
Lead In: Do you think globalisation—the increased trade between countries 
in goods, services, and investments—has had a negative effect, no effect, 
or a positive effect on each of the following:	  
1. American/British Factory Workers	  
	   Negative 
Effect	  
No Effect	   Positive 
Effect	  
Percent of 
Cases Present	  
US	   69.6% 	   13.9 	   16.5 	   89.8% 	  
UK	   63.9%	   19.6 	   16.4 	   86.6% 	  
	  
2. You and Your Immediate Family	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   Negative 
Effect	  
No Effect	   Positive 
Effect	  
Percent of 
Cases Present	  
US	   28.3% 	   47.4 	   24.3 	   87.6% 	  
UK	   21.9% 	   51.3	   26.8 	   84.9%	  
	  
3. The American/British Economy	  
	   Negative 
Effect	  
No Effect	   Positive 
Effect	  
Percent of 
Cases Present	  
US	   57.3% 	   15.5 	   27.2 	   88.8% 	  
UK	   45.8% 	   23.0 	   31.1	   84.8%	  
	  
4. The Average American/British Consumer	  
	   Negative 
Effect	  
No Effect	   Positive 
Effect	  
Percent of 
Cases Present	  
US	   39.1%	   23.3 	   37.6 	   87.3% 	  
UK	   28.6% 	   31.1 	   40.3 	   85.0%	  
	  
5. American/British Businesses	  
	   Negative 
Effect	  
No Effect	   Positive 
Effect	  
Percent of 
Cases Present	  
US	   50.4% 	   16.7 	   32.9 	   88.1% 	  
UK	   41.6% 	   22.9 	   35.5	   83.4%	  
	  
Latent Variable: Isolationism (From November 2011 Wave of Survey)	  
1. The US/UK’s interests are best protected by avoiding involvement with 
other .	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	    10.4%	   18.5 	   29.7 	   30.0 	   11.5 	   96.9% 	  
UK	   9.7% 	   35.0 	   28.5 	   19.7 	   7.0 	   95.9%	  
	  
2. The US/UK shouldn't risk its citizens’ happiness and well-being by 
getting involved with other .	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	    7.1%	   19.9 	   31.9 	   26.4 	   14.7 	   97.7%	  
UK	    2.3%	   23.0 	   27.9	   32.6	   14.2 	   96.9% 	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3. The US/UK needs to simply mind its own business when it comes to 
international affairs.	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   8.9% 	   28.4 	   29.8 	   20.0 	   13.0 	   98.2% 	  
UK	   8.0%	   38.8   	   27.2 	   18.2 	    7.7	   97.1% 	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Latent Variable: Economic Evaluations (From May/June 2012 Wave of Survey)	  
1. How do you think the general economic situation in this country has 
changed over the last 12 months?  Has it:	  
	  
	   Gotten a 
lot 
Better	  
Gotten a 
little 
Better	  
Stayed 
the Same	  
Gotten a 
Little 
Worse	  
Gotten a 
Lot 
Worse	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   2.1%  	   34.3  	   25.9  	   20.1  	   17.6  	   97.8%  	  
UK	   0.5%	    6.8	   22.7	   39.4	   30.6	   98.7%	  
	  
2. How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what 
it was 12 months ago?  Has it:	  
	  
	   Gotten a 
lot 
Better	  
Gotten a 
little 
Better	  
Stayed 
the Same	  
Gotten a 
Little 
Worse	  
Gotten a 
Lot 
Worse	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   4.4%  	   19.1  	   40.5  	   25.5  	   10.5  	   98.6%  	  
UK	   3.2%	    9.8 	   38.8	   35.2	   13.0	   99.4%	  
	  
3. How do you think the financial situation of your household will change 
over the next 12 months?  Will it:	  
	   	   	   48	  
	  
	   Get a 
lot 
Better	  
Get a 
little 
Better	  
Stay the 
Same	  
Get a 
Little 
Worse	  
Get a 
Lot 
Worse	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   5.2%  	   24.9  	   46.1  	   17.6  	   6.2  	   94.4%  	  
UK	   1.5%	   11.2	   39.3	   35.8	   12.3  	   99.4%	  
	  
4. How do you think the general economic situation in this country will 
develop over the next 12 months?  Will it:	  
	   Get a 
lot 
Better	  
Get a 
little 
Better	  
Stay the 
Same	  
Get a 
Little 
Worse	  
Get a 
Lot 
Worse	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	    4.0 	   32.4  	   31.4  	   20.7  	   11.4  	   93.1%  	  
UK	    1.0	   13.4	   22.7	   37.1	   20.9  	   96.2%	  
	  
Latent Variable:  Patriotism (From May/June 2012 Wave of the Survey)	  
1. People who do not wholeheartedly support America/Britain should live 
elsewhere. 	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   23.2% 	   18.7 	   23.2 	   17.2 	   17.8 	   97.7% 	  
UK	   27.0%	   24.6	   24.1	   15.8	    8.4	   97.0%	  
	  
2. I support American/British policies for the very reason that they are 
the policies of my country. 	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   11.0% 	   21.8	    33.0	   20.4 	   13.7 	   97.7% 	  
UK	   5.3%	   25.9  	    33.5 	   23.2 	   12.0 	   96.4%	  
	  
3.	  There is already enough criticism of America/Britain abroad, so we should 
not make things worse by saying bad things about the country. 	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	    14.6%	   20.2 	   27.2 	   21.4 	   16.5 	   98.0% 	  
UK	   9.3%	   32.0  	   29.1 	   20.0 	   9.7 	   94.1%	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4. In matters of international affairs, America/Britain is virtually always 
right.	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	    5.1%	   12.7 	   34.2 	   30.4 	    17.6	   96.7% 	  
UK	    2.4%	   13.9	   40.2	   30.8	    12.7	   91.7%	  
	  
5. I believe America/British policies are always the morally correct ones. 	  
	   Strongly 
Agree	  
Agree	   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree	  
Disagree	   Strongly 
Disagree	  
Percent 
of Cases 
Present	  
US	   4.6% 	   12.0 	   30.0 	   31.9 	   21.4 	   97.8% 	  
UK	   4.4%	   14.8	   38.9	   29.8	   12.0	   95.6%	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
